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Abstract. Roles are important both theoretically and practically for modelling the world around us. Although many theories of
roles have been proposed, there remain aspects which are little understood. In this paper we investigate roles and their contexts
from a temporal point of view. We introduce the idea of a family of occurrent-dependent roles as a means to organise prospective
and retrospective derived roles around an original role from which they are derived. By this means we account for the existence
of groups of similar roles which are difficult to distinguish without a careful analysis of the temporal aspects. Following detailed
informal discussion, we present a preliminary formalisation of the key concepts and relations.
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1. Introduction
There are many kinds of roles, and they can be classified in various ways. One way is to classify a role
according to the type of entity that can play it: some roles, such as teacher , speaker and front-wheel are
played by objects and may therefore be called ‘object roles’; others, such as preparation and post-process
are played by occurrents (for example the particular activities that constitute a preparation for something
else) and are therefore ‘occurrent roles’. In this paper we will mainly discuss object roles. Another way
to classify a role is in terms of the context it depends on: we will argue that roles such as schoolteacher
and wife depend on contexts which are objects (in these examples a school and a marriage partnership
respectively), and we therefore call roles of this kind ‘object-dependent’; other roles depend on a context
consisting of some process or event, as for example the context for speaker is an act of speaking, and
these are therefore ‘occurrent-dependent’ roles. Roles that have been discussed in the literature are mainly
object-dependent roles such as teacher , president , and wife; occurrent-dependent roles, by contrast, have
been much less studied, and the purpose of this paper is to begin filling this gap.
In this paper,1 we investigate the important part played by time in the characterisation of certain
occurrent-dependent roles such as candidate and murderer . We propose a new view of roles by which we
distinguish between ‘original roles’ and ‘derived roles’, and introduce the new concept of a ‘role family’
which brings together an original role and its associated derived roles. What we ordinarily understand
by the murderer role has a retrospective character in that it is defined in relation to some past event: a
murderer is someone who has murdered someone in the past. Thus the role (murderer ) can exist even at
1This paper extends ideas previously introduced in (Mizoguchi, Sunagawa, Kozaki, & Kitamura,2007;Mizoguchi, Kozaki, &
Kitamura,2012b,2012a;Kozaki, Kitamura, & Mizoguchi,2012). In developing these ideas further, we have found it convenient to
make extensive revisions to some of the terminology. Where appropriate in what follows we will draw attention to significant
deviations from the earlier usages.
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a time when its context (the murder event) is no longer present. When the murder is actually committed,
the perpetrator is playing the role of murderer in a more direct sense, since the context for the role is then
present (thus the role is ongoing). We call this more direct sense an original role, and the retrospective
sense a derived role. This will be explained more fully below.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In §2 we introduce the background theory of roles underpinning
the work presented here: this develops work previously presented in (Mizoguchi et al.,2007). The roles
discussed in this section are all object-dependent roles. In §3 we turn our attention to occurrent-dependent
roles, taking account of the division of occurrents into processes or events, and introduce the distinc-
tion between original and derived roles, leading to the idea of a family of roles, comprising an original
occurrent-dependent role together with the derived roles arising from it. This is the central contribution of
this paper. We conclude this section with an illustrative case study to help fix the various distinctions in the
reader’s mind. In §4 we probe more deeply into some of the subtleties of the theory, paying close attention
to the notion of the ‘content’ of a role; here we distinguish between ‘definitional’ and ‘performable’ con-
tents, a distinction which leads in turn to a closer analysis of the notion of ‘playing’ a role, which we now
divide into two distinct components called ‘holding’ and ‘performing’. We explore the theory further in §5
by examining in detail a number of problematic cases requiring sensitive analysis. Then, in §6 we present
a preliminary formalisation of our theory in first-order logic. A brief comparison with related work in
presented in §7, and §8 concludes with some pointers to outstanding problems requiring further research.
2. A theory of object-dependent roles
A wheel is just a wheel, but the front wheel of a bicycle, while it is indeed a wheel, is not just a wheel:
it is the front wheel of a bicycle. If the front wheel is removed from the bicycle and a new one put in its
place, then the old front wheel is still a wheel but it is no longer the front wheel of the bicycle. Instead,
a different wheel plays that role. Suppose the front wheel is removed and not replaced. The bicycle now
has a missing front wheel — which is to say that it does not have a front wheel, but it has a place where
a front wheel should be. In this section we introduce the terminology for describing situations like this in
ontological terms.
2.1. Roles, Role-holders, and Contexts
We begin by clarifying the key terms we will need for our discussion of roles. We introduce these terms
in the context of the bicycle example, but then go on to discuss them more generally and in relation to
other examples.
– The bicycle itself, as a complex object, is the context for various roles, including the role
front-wheel .
– The front-wheel role may be played by any suitable wheel, which may be called a potential player
of the role, and when that happens, the wheel becomes a role-holder, the holder of the front-wheel
role for that particular bicycle.
– A holder of the front-wheel role in a bicycle is contingently a part of the bicycle; there is a double
contingency here, since:
1. a given wheel may at different times play the front-wheel role with respect to different bicycles
(that is, it may play different instances of the generic front-wheel role), and it may at other times
not play a front-wheel role at all;
2. the front-wheel role of a given bicycle may be played by different wheels at different times, and
it may at other times not be played by any wheel at all; these are the times at which the bicycle
has a missing front wheel: the front-wheel role still exists, but it is unplayed because there is no
role-holder for it.
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All of these concepts — context, role, role-holder, player — and the relations amongt them may be
thought of both at the class level, as universals, and at the instance level, as particulars (cf. Loebe,2005).
Thus the generic front-wheel role is dependent on the generic context bicycle, while particular instances
of the front-wheel role depend on particular instances of the context bicycle. This is illustrated in Figure 1,
where we note that a particular instance Bicycle39 of the class bicycle serves as a context for a particular
role front-wheel -of -bicycle39 , which is currently being played by the instance Wheel46 of the class
wheel. The role front-wheel -of -Bicycle39 is itself an instance of the role class front-wheel -of -bicycle.
The potential players of this role are wheels, that is, instances of the universal wheel; not every such
instance is suitable to play this role, since any particular bicycle imposes restrictions on what kind of
wheel can play its front-wheel role (for example, it needs to be a bicycle wheel of a particular size).
Wheel46
front wheel of
Bicycle39
Wheel46 as
front wheel of
Bicycle39
Bicycle39
front wheel 
of bicycle
bicycle wheel
instance of
depends on
depends on
can play
plays
CONTEXTS ROLES ROLE-HOLDERS PLAYERS
CLASSES
INSTANCES
wheel as front 
wheel of bicycle
instance of
instance of
instance of
Fig. 1. The ‘front wheel’ role of a bicycle. Compare Figure 3 in (Loebe,2005) which, while similar, does not distinguish between
roles and role-holders.
We describe the individual role-holder here as Wheel46-as-front-wheel-of -Bicycle39; it is neither
a role nor simply a wheel as such, but a kind of composite of the two, a wheel qua player of the role. This
composition can be interpreted as the addition of the properties of the role to the player. By playing the
role, the role-holder inherits new properties from the role. We might describe a particular front wheel as
incorrectly positioned, or loose, or the wrong size, and none of these qualities belong to the wheel as such,
but only in its capacity as the player of the front-wheel role: they are, in other words, properties of the
role-holder.
For clarity of exposition, we have chosen to introduce our view of roles in relation to a particularly
simple example, but the theory of roles only really comes into it own when we turn to more complex
examples, most notably those in which the players of roles are human beings or other animate subjects. In
fact our diagram in Figure 1 is based on a diagram we have presented elsewhere (Mizoguchi et al.,2007)
which treats the same complex of concepts and relations in the context of the schoolteacher role in a
school.
In many ways the case of schoolteacher is analogous to front-wheel .2 A school provides the context
for many different roles, not only various teachers, but also a head, pupils, secretaries, cleaners, and so
on. These roles can be thought of as slots which are filled by the people who play the roles (compare ‘the
place where a front wheel should be’). When X plays a role Y, it means that X “acts as” Y, contingently
acting in ways that characterise the role Y. If John plays a teacher role then John acts as a teacher, but
can also then be said to be a teacher. This means that the word ‘teacher’ can be regarded as somewhat
2For brevity, we shall usually use teacher to designate this role; it is to be understood that, for the purposes of this paper,
teacher refers to a schoolteacher, not, for example, a private teacher not attached to any educational establishment.
4 R. Mizoguchi et al. / Families of Roles
ambiguous, referring now to the role itself and now to the role-holder, the person considered as a player
of the role. Such entities have elsewhere been called ‘qua individuals’ (Masolo, Guizzardi, Vieu, Bottazzi,
& Ferrario,2005) or ‘relational tropes’ (Guizzardi,2005,2006).
More generally, if a collection of entities are interrelated in such a way that it is natural to consider them
as forming a unitary whole, then this whole may be regarded as a context within which each of the entities
it comprises plays a role. Thus an entity can be seen as a role-holder with respect to a role defined within
a context. The role-holder is dependent on both the entity itself and the role, and the role is dependent
on the context. If the context is destroyed then the role disappears and therefore the entity ceases to be
a role-holder: in effect the role-holder also disappears, just leaving the entity. Thus if a school is closed
down, the teachers still exist as people but no longer as teachers (in that school — of course they may get
jobs in other schools, playing different but analogous roles in the new contexts); similarly, if a bicycle is
dismantled, its front wheel still exists as a wheel but no longer as a front wheel — but again, it may be
redeployed as the front wheel of a different bicycle, playing another instance of the front-wheel role.
By a potential player of a role we mean an entity that is able to play that role. Thus any person with
appropriate qualifications is a potential player of the teacher role; a person who plays it is thereby a
teacher role-holder. In many cases, potential players are of natural types such as human, but a role-
holder can also be a potential player of another role: in a school, for instance, the potential players of the
head -of -year -9 role are themselves already role-holders, players of the teacher role.
2.2. Roles and role-holders
In the previous section we noted that words such as ‘teacher’ can display an element of ambiguity,
referring either to a role or a role-holder. In fact this potential ambiguity is compounded by the fact that
a number of properties can be said to apply to both roles and role-holders: for example, both the role and
the role-holder are ontologically dependent on their context. In view of this, the reader may wonder why
it is necessary to distinguish between a role and its holder. We offer two main reasons for this, as follows.
First, a role-holder has all the properties of the individual playing the role, as well as additional proper-
ties which result from the fact that they are playing the role. Thus a teacher, being a person, has a name,
address, date of birth, height, eye-colour, marital status, and so on, none of which is derived from the
teacher role, but also has properties such as being in charge of a certain class, or being a member of a
particular department in the school, which are only possessed by the individual as a player of the teacher
role. A role, on the other hand, does not have any of the properties of an individual; for example, it does
not make sense to associate an eye-colour with a teacher role.
Second, a role can exist even in the absence of a corresponding role-holder. If a school has a vacancy
for a teaching position then the role exists, ready to be played, but until someone is actually appointed to
the position there is no role-holder for it. Therefore the role and the role-holder must be distinct entities.
The bicycle with a missing front wheel is a similar case where a role exists without a role-holder.
This view of roles and role-holders is not shared by the majority of ontologists. Steimann (2000) lists
15 “features” of roles which he has identified as having been put forward in the literature on roles; the
features are not all compatible, and indeed his features 14 and 15 are that an object and its roles share
identity and that an object and its roles have different identities respectively, the latter view being regarded
as “quite singular”. In fact, we find we can give qualified agreement to both 14 and 15, so long as ‘role’ is
understood as ‘role-holder’ in the former and as ‘role’ in the latter. More exactly, when an object plays a
role, the role-holder which thereby exists is related to the object rather as the vase is related to the clay it
is made of: this relation is often characterised as one of constitution rather than identity; that is, the vase
is constituted by the clay, meaning that while in a certain sense the vase “is” the clay, it cannot simply be
equated with it since the two have distinct identity criteria (for example the clay continues to exist after
the vase is destroyed). In a similar way, we might say that a teacher “is” a person, but this cannot be strict
identity since the person already existed before becoming a teacher, and when the person resigns from the
role then the teacher no longer exists but the person still does. Hence our assent to Steimann’s 14 is only
qualified. This also shows that the role is distinct from both the object and the role-holder: the teacher role
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that the person played may continue to exist after the person has resigned from it, perhaps to be filled by
a different person.
2.3. Determining context
In the examples given above, we have taken the view that a role-holder is part of the context of its
role. The front wheel of a bicycle is part of the bicycle, and the bicycle is the context for the front-wheel
role; a schoolteacher is part of a school, and the school is the context for the schoolteacher role. In these
cases we are dealing with roles whose contexts are objects, and we therefore refer to such roles as object-
dependent roles. By ‘object’ here we mean an independent continuant; thus object-dependent roles are
also continuant-dependent roles. The main focus in the remainder of this paper, however, will be on a
different class of roles, which we call occurrent-dependent. These will be introduced in section 3. Before
we proceed to these, however, we must provide further justification for considering the contexts of some
roles to be objects.
We stated above that the context for a schoolteacher role is the school in which the role is held. The
teacher, qua role-player, is an employee of the school, contracted to perform certain duties such as teach-
ing. This might suggest alternative possibilities for identifying the context of the role. Might not the con-
text be the state of having been appointed by the school to teach? Or perhaps it is the activities, such as
teaching, that are performed by the teacher in discharge of the duties laid down in the contract? The lat-
ter would make schoolteacher an occurrent-dependent role; the former would make it a state-dependent
role, though whether one regarded this as continuant-dependent or occurrent-dependent would depend on
whether one sided with BFO (which treats states as continuants) or with DOLCE (which treats them as
occurrents).
A problem with both these possibilities — context as state, and context as activity — is that they fail to
account for some situations in which it is natural to refer to a schoolteacher role. A schoolteacher is still
a schoolteacher when asleep or on holiday, and therefore not performing any of the activities associated
with the role. This shows that those activities cannot be the context – or at any rate not the whole of the
context — for the role. Moreover, as already noted, if a school has a vacancy for a teacher, this vacancy
may be considered as defining a teacher role which is unfilled: the context of this role cannot be a state
of employment, since currently no-one is in that state, nor can it be any actually occurring activities
performed by a holder of the role, since currently there are none. Thus the role cannot be dependent either
on the state of employment of someone playing the role or on any activities which might be performed by
such a player, since the role can exist in the absence of any of these things. But the role cannot exist in the
absence of the school itself: if the school were to be shut down then all its associated roles would cease
to exist. Thus the role is ontologically dependent on the school, which may therefore be identified as the
context of the role.
Similar considerations apply to other roles we mentioned above as being object-dependent, such as
president and wife . In a republic, the role of president is laid down in the constitution which defines the
republic as a political entity. Typically, the person who holds that role, the president himself or herself,
has been elected (not necessarily democratically!) to that position, and in playing the role will typically
undertake various duties that are laid down in the constitution. But neither the state of having been elected
as president, nor the activities involved in discharging the presidential duties, can provide the context for
the role, since the role itself can exist in their absence. When Kennedy was assassinated, for example,
vice-president Johnson automatically assumed the role of president despite not having been elected to that
position; and if the president were to undergo a prolonged period of illness, the characteristic presidential
activities might fail to be performed, without the role thereby ceasing to exist. In fact the role of president
is defined in relation to the republic via its constitution, and not to the state of having been elected,
which merely describes the normal way in which someone comes to hold the role, nor to the actual
performance of certain duties, which again do not determine the existence of the role even though under
normal conditions they are strongly associated with it.
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The role wife may be defined as one component of a marriage partnership; a specific instance such as
John’s wife could be defined as ‘the female member of a marriage partnership in which the other member
is John’. Such a partnership — which is an object — comes into being as a result of a marriage ceremony;
and if one is a member of a marriage partnership then one is, of course, in the state of being married, but
it seems to us more natural to say that the state of being married is dependent on the partnership than the
other way round. This being so, it must be the partnership, and not the state dependent on it, that forms
a context for its constituent roles of husband and wife . The issue is however less clear-cut than in the
case of schoolteacher, since a marriage partnership can only exist if both its constituent roles are filled:
if John is unmarried there is no unplayed role John’s wife, since this would imply that John was part of a
marriage partnership in which one of the roles is vacant. But such partnerships do not exist!
3. Occurrent-dependent roles
3.1. Processes and process-dependent roles
In common with many other researchers (compare Moens & Steedman,1988), we regard process as
a broad category of occurrent entities characterised in terms of the manner in which they occupy time.
Processes, in contrast to events, are open-ended, meaning that when a process is in operation, there is no
reason, in principle, why it should not continue in operation indefinitely. A process does not have a natural
termination point at which it may be said to become complete; instead, when a process stops operating,
it just ceases, with no notion of completion or finality associated with it. Thus, for example, singing,
running, and eating are all processes, whereas singing a song, running a mile, and eating an apple are
events.3 From this it is evident that at least some events are so to speak “made” of processes: the singing
of a song, which is an event, comprises an instance of the singing process that constitutes a completed
performance of a song.
The examples given so far are all human activities, and such activities form one important subclass
of processes. But there are also many processes which are not the activities of humans or other animals,
notably natural processes such as the flowing of a river, the falling of the rain, the growth of a plant, and
the circulation of the blood. We shall, however, have less to say about these kinds of processes, although
they too can have roles associated with them.
A large class of roles may be characterised in terms of participation in a process. This is most obvious
in cases where the process is an activity, by which we mean a process which is performed or enacted by
some agent, who thereby is said to participate in the process. This gives us roles such as singer , runner ,
and eater . We will see below that with terms such as these there are often delicate issues of interpretation,
depending on the context in which they are used, but for now we focus on what may be called pure
process-dependent roles, defined as follows:
– For an activity Xing, an agent x plays the role of Xer at precisely those times at which x is Xing.
In this sense, one is an eater/runner/singer just when one is actually eating/running/singing.
It should be noted, however, that it is not always clear exactly when any of these activities is actually in
progress. Take singing, for example. This can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. In the narrowest sense
of the word, one is only singing when one is actually producing musical sounds with the voice. In the
course of singing a song, there may be several bars of rest during which one is not actually singing in
this narrow sense; but there is a somewhat broader sense in which it is natural to say that one is singing
even during such rests. Now, consider the case of someone who says ‘I have been singing all evening’,
having spent the evening performing in a vocal concert. During the concert there will undoubtedly have
been times when she was not singing in either of the two preceding senses, for example while the audience
were applauding, in the gaps between consecutive items in the concert, and during the interval. But in a
3More exactly, these expressions designate event types, of which there may be many concrete instances, or tokens.
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broader sense still, it may be said that she was singing throughout those times as well. Thus the process of
singing may be conceived in various different ways, to each of which corresponds, therefore, a different
understanding of the role singer .
It is sometimes said that processes can admit “gaps”, and examples like the foregoing are cited in
support of this. We believe that this is a misunderstanding: in fact we regard processes as dissective in
nature, meaning that if a process is in operation over some interval of time then it is in operation over
all subintervals of that interval. This is certainly the case for each of the three interpretations of singing
described in the previous paragraph; if we call these singing1, singing2, and singing3, respectively, then
it is true for each i that if one is singingi over an interval then one is singingi over each subinterval of
that interval. When people say that processes admit gaps, their purported justification for this amounts to
saying that if one is singing2 or singing3 over an interval then there may be subintervals of that interval
over which one is not singing1. So the supposed phenomenon of “gaps” reduces to the existence of broader
and narrower perspectives on an activity.
The dissectivity of a process, when taken to the limit, suggests that when a process is in operation over
an interval, it can be said to be in operation at each instant of that interval: ‘What were you doing at
exactly 12 o’clock today?’ — ‘I was singing’. It is no objection to this that any singing must in fact extend
over an interval: the fact that one cannot be singing only at 12 o’clock does not imply that one cannot
be singing at 12 o’clock. This leads further to the idea that a process may possess different properties at
different instants (progressing at different rates, for example, or with different intensities, or in different
locations), which means that a process, unlike an event, may be said to undergo change. In this respect,
processes have a continuant-like character, as argued in (Galton & Mizoguchi,2009); but they are also
occurrent-like, in that as mentioned above they provide the “raw material” for events, and in this paper we
treat process-dependent roles as a subclass of occurrent-dependent ones.
In the discussion of the different granularities with respect to which a process-dependent role such as
singer might be defined, we came close to trespassing on the “delicate issues” mentioned in the third
paragraph of this section. If we ask how many singers there are in a certain choir, one possibility might
be to interpret singer here as a process-dependent role in which the process is interpreted so broadly that
one may be ‘singing in the choir’ even on days when there is no rehearsal or performance. This does
seem rather strained, however, and we regard it as more natural to treat ‘singer’ here as denoting the
object-dependent role choir -member , whose context is the choir, and not a process-dependent one.
3.2. Events and event-dependent roles
As suggested in the previous section, a key distinction between events and processes is that an event,
unlike a process, carries with it the notion of an intrinsic completion. This means that once an event has
occurred, it cannot in any sense go on occurring; at best, there might be an occurrence of another event of
the same type. Once you have sung a song, you can sing it again, but that is a new event, not a continuation
of the preceding one.
Events may be durative (extended in time) or punctual (effectively or really instantaneous), and to some
extent this is a matter of granularity; when a train starts moving, for example, this is naturally regarded
as instantaneous, but if we step up the temporal magnification we can see that it takes some time for the
motion to be communicated from the engine to all the parts of the train, so the inception of motion is
“smeared out” over an interval, at the beginning of which all parts of the train are at rest and at the end
of which all the parts are in motion. Thus an event which is punctual at a coarse granularity may become
durative at a finer one.
For our purposes, it is convenient to follow the analysis of Moens and Steedman (1988), whose discus-
sion of events makes use of a fundamental tripartite structure called a nucleus, consisting of a punctual
culmination, an associated preparatory process, and a consequent state. One can view the same situa-
tion at different granularities to yield different nuclei. An example considered by Moens and Steedman
is climbing Everest. On a close view, we can take the final attainment of the summit to be the culmina-
tion, with the climbing that leads up to this as the preparatory process, and the state of being at the top
8 R. Mizoguchi et al. / Families of Roles
the consequent state. On a broader view, we can take the whole ‘culminated process’ consisting of the
climbing together with the attainment of the summit to be the culmination, in which case the preparatory
process consists of activities leading up to the climbing, such as assembling the necessary equipment and
travelling to base camp; the consequent state is that of having climbed Everest — a state which persists
even after the descent.
What roles are associated with events? Since climbing is a process, there is of course a pure process-
dependent role climber , which as described previously may be interpreted more or less narrowly. But
here it is not just climbing that is under consideration, it is climbing Everest. This suggests a role
Everest-climber . When can someone be said to play this role? In (Masolo, Vieu, Kitamura, Kozaki, &
Mizoguchi,2011), definition d19 states that x is an Everest climber at time t if and only if x is at t the
agent of a climbing e of which the goal is the top of Everest. This appears to leave it open whether the
goal of e has to be achieved in order for the agent to be an Everest-climber. But if one starts climbing
up Everest with the intention of reaching the top, and gives up before getting there, then it does not seem
appropriate to say that one is an Everest-climber. In fact, it is only at the moment of reaching the top that
once can truly proclaim ‘Now I am an Everest-climber!’. So it does seem that the role Everest-climber
is only played by those who complete an ascent of Everest, and the time at which this role is played is,
precisely, the moment of completion. If you do not make it to the top, you are a failed Everest-climber ,
which is a quite different role.
Having reached the summit, and thus become an Everest-climber, there is then a further sense in which
one can be said to remain an Everest-climber. In this sense of the term, an Everest-climber is not just some-
one in the act of reaching the summit of Everest, but more generally someone who has this achievement
to their credit, meaning that they have reached the summit in the past. In this latter sense, it is a role one
retains for the rest of one’s life, and perhaps even beyond. Roles such as Oscar -winner and murderer are
similar in this respect. In (Masolo et al.,2011) this kind of role is called a ‘historical role’, and the most
important thing to note about such roles is that a person can only play one of them by virtue of having
previously played the more immediate role from which it is derived. Thus you can be an Everest-climber
in the historical sense only if you have previously been an Everest-climber in what we might call the
“experiential” sense: at some past time t you attained the summit of Everest.
It often happens that the words used to denote event-dependent roles are systematically ambiguous in
this way. We shall use the following terminology to describe event-dependent roles of the kind we have
discussed here:
– An original event-dependent role is played by a participant of an event at the time that event culmi-
nates; the culmination of the event is then the context for the role.
– A retrospective derived event-dependent role (or retrospective role for short) is played by a participant
of an event at any time during which the consequent state associated with the event holds. The context
of the role is again the culmination of the event.
Another example is witness . A person plays the original witness role when they actually see the event
to which they are witness. After the event is over, they are no longer witnesses in this sense, but they are
still witnesses to the event, and might for example be interviewed by the police or summoned to court
in precisely that capacity; but this witness role is a derived role — you cannot be a witness in this sense
without first being a witness in the original sense.4 As discussed above, a similar distinction exists for the
role murderer — and also, we might add, victim .
It will be noticed that both an original event-dependent role and the retrospective role derived from it
depend on the same context. The difference is that in the case of an original role, the context is present at
the time the role is being played, whereas with a derived role this is not the case, or not necessarily so. In
this connection we now state explicitly how we will use the terms ‘exist’ and ‘present’ in this paper. We
use the word ‘exist’ in a timeless sense that applies to any fully determinate particular located in space
and time, whereas we only apply the word ‘present’ to those existent particulars whose time of existence
4For more on witness , see §5.2.
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includes the present. Thus in the case of the retrospective Everest-climber role the context, which is the
actual attainment of the summit, still exists but is no longer present.
There may of course be some uncertainty as to exactly when an original role is played: if a man puts
poison into his victim’s drink, he does not thereby become a murderer until the drink is consumed and the
victim dies, which may be some time afterwards (by which time it is possible that the murderer himself
is dead). When did the murder take place: when the poison was laid or when the victim died? There is
a good deal of discussion on this matter in the philosophical literature on action and responsibility (see
Davidson,1969;Thomson,1971;Pols,2013 amongst many others); but this does not vitiate our concept of
original role since any uncertainty attaching to this in particular cases is already present in the scenario to
which the concept is being applied.
One possible approach to this is to say that the context for the original murderer role is the last relevant
action of the murderer, but that this action only becomes such a context when the victim dies. Thus at the
time that the original murderer role is played it may not yet be determined that it is in fact a murderer
role (though of course in cases when the victim dies straight away it is). In that case we could say that
that action is potentially the context for a murderer role, so that at the time of the action the murderer is a
potential holder of the original role, and during the time leading up to the victim’s death, he is a potential
holder of the retrospective murderer role; once the victim dies, these potentialities become actual.
3.3. Prospective roles
Retrospective roles naturally arise in cases where the completion of the event coincides with the time at
which the process associated with the event comes to an end. But there are examples of events for which,
at least under one natural interpretation, the completion marks the beginning of the associated process.
An example is departure, which forms the context for an original departing-passenger role. While we
could, to be sure, think of departure as the culmination of a process of preparation for departure (travelling
to the station, buying a ticket, getting on the train, and so on), what makes it a departure is what comes
next, namely the motion of the train out of the station. The interesting thing is that we often use the phrase
‘departing passenger’ to refer to people undergoing the processes preparatory to the actual departure. This
is a derived role, which is played before the original role from which it is derived; it is a prospective role,
in contrast to the retrospective roles discussed in the preceding section.
There is an important lack of symmetry between prospective and retrospective derived roles. To be
a murderer, it is necessary that one has actually murdered someone, and in general, in order to play a
retrospective derived role it is necessary to have played, at some point in the past, the original role from
which it is derived. For someone to be a departing passenger, on the other hand, it is not necessary that
they will eventually depart; rather, they must be in a situation characterised by an inherent forward-looking
reference to an expected future departure. This forward reference can be established by, for example, the
fact of having bought a ticket for the departure in question, or having registered the intention to participate
in the departure in some other way (for example by waiting at the place of departure or joining the right
queue). Normally anyone in such a situation will indeed depart, thereby also playing the original role from
which the prospective role is derived, but it is perfectly possible that at the last minute something may
prevent the passenger from departing.
This lack of symmetry arises from the inherent asymmetry of time itself, or at least of our experiential
and cognitive relation to it. This asymmetry does not mean that at the time a prospective derived role is
being played, it can only be ascribed to the player provisionally. Someone described as a departing passen-
ger may in the end fail to depart, perhaps because they change their mind or because the train is cancelled.
This would not mean that they had not been a departing passenger after all. Similarly, the original role
of candidate , whether for an examination or an election, which is played while the examination or elec-
tion is actually taking place, gives rise to a prospective derived role which is played during the time from
when the role-holder’s candidacy is first declared (by whatever means) until the time of the examination
or election itself — or, exceptionally, until the candidate withdraws their candidacy or the examination or
election is cancelled.
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Another distinction that is illustrated by these examples cuts across the prospective/retrospective divi-
sion. To be a murderer, it is not just necessary, but also sufficient to have murdered someone. This implies
that once one has become a murderer, one is always a murderer — one cannot stop being a murderer in
this derived sense. In this sense, the period of validity of the murderer role is unlimited.5 But the period of
validity of the prospective departing-passenger role is limited, beginning, perhaps, when one first books
a ticket, or when one arrives at the station. Thus for someone to count as a departing passenger, it is not
sufficient that at some time in the future they will depart, and this prevents this role from having unlimited
validity into the past.
There are retrospective roles with limited validity too. An example is applicant (for a job). To play this
role it is necessary to have applied for a job, but in addition, one’s application must still be “live”, that is,
the applicant is being considered for short-listing, or has been shortlisted and is awaiting interview, or has
been interviewed and is awaiting a decision. Once the appointment has been made, all the applicants to
the job cease being applicants, and one of them assumes a new role, that of appointee. This example is
discussed further in section 4.2.
The case of candidate differs importantly from departing-passenger in that while both are examples
of prospective derived roles, the original departing-passenger role is dependent on an instantaneous event
— marking the moment of departure when the train/boat/plane starts moving — whereas the original
candidate role is dependent on a process. In the case of a candidate for an examination, this process
typically consists of the candidate writing answers or performing pieces (in a music exam), but for a
candidate in an election the process need not involve active participation of the candidate at all, being
rather marked by the polling stations being open and people coming in to vote. This shows that while
prospective derived roles typically come from event-dependent original roles, it is also possible for them
to come from process-dependent ones.
In general, however, processes do not give rise to prospective derived roles. Consider, for example, the
original process-dependent roles walker and singer , understood simply as someone who is walking or
singing. The corresponding prospective derived roles would be played by someone solely by virtue of the
fact that they will be walking or singing in the future. Such roles are essentially contentless since there
are not, in general, any activities that characterise someone who is going to be walking or singing, and
therefore we do not find a need to refer to a person in this position by a name that could designate a role:
it suffices to say that someone will be a singer, a simple future-tense reference with no implications for
the present. An exception might be if one were to ask ‘Who are the singers in next week’s concert?’,
where it might be argued that being signed up to sing in the concert, with the various responsibilities and
preparatory activities associated with that, do amount to a substantial role, which may be characterised
as the prospective role derived from the original role that is played during the concert itself. But this
original role is more than just the plain singer role considered earlier, since it includes also the role of
scheduled -performer , which as it were throws its shadow back into the past to give rise to a prospective
derived role. This role is not unlike candidate in this respect.6
Another interesting feature of the derived candidate role is that it exists in two forms, one prospective
and the other retrospective. Up to now we have only considered the prospective form, but it should be
noted that one still counts as a candidate after the exam has taken place or the voting has closed, up until
the time at which the results of the exam are released or the winner of the election is announced. This
retrospective derived role is related to, but clearly different from its prospective counterpart, as can be
seen by considering the different activities associated with the two positions — before, studying hard for
the exam; after, waiting for the results. Another difference is that whereas the activities associated with
the prospective candidacy are in preparation for the process associated with the original role, the activities
associated with the retrospective candidacy relate back to the completion of that process (since the result
of the examination is derived from the completed exam paper rather than the process of producing it;
5Other retrospective roles with unlimited periods of validity include author (of a particular book), painter (of a particular
painting), and composer (of a particular piece of music). These roles are related to, but distinct from, roles with the same names
referring to people who write, paint, or compose, without reference to a specific output.
6But see also the discussion of invited-speaker and related roles in §5.3.
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the result of the election depends on the total votes cast at the end of the day rather than the process by
which votes accumulate while the ballot is open). Hence we suggest that the prospective role is process-
dependent, whereas the retrospective role is event-dependent; and this is a common pattern which we will
find repeated in other examples.
3.4. Families of Roles
Pulling together the above observations, we can distinguish a family of four different kinds of occurrent-
dependent roles (and corresponding role-holders), as follows:
1. Original process-dependent roles such as walker and singer . These roles are played by people who
are actually in the process of walking or singing. Notation: ORpr.
2. Original event-dependent roles such as murderer and departing passenger , which are dependent
on instantaneous events marking the culmination of some process. This kind of role is played only
at the moment of culmination (the completion of the act of murder itself, the moment of departure).
Notation: ORev.
3. Prospective derived roles which are related to expected future playings of original process- or event-
dependent roles, e.g., departing passenger or candidate . Notations: DR+pr, DR
+
ev.
4. Retrospective derived roles which are related to actual past playings of original process- or event-
dependent roles, e.g., murderer , witness . Notation: DR−ev.
For clarity we shall sometimes use similar annotations in conjunction with particular role-names,
thereby distinguishing, for example, murdererev (the original murderer role) from murderer−ev (the ret-
rospective derived murderer role). The two forms of derived candidate role discussed at the end of §3.3
can be distinguished as candidate+pr and candidate
−
ev , depending on the original roles candidatepr and
candidateev respectively. These four roles together constitute the candidate family; the murderer family
contains only two roles since there is no prospective derived role in this case — a person preparing for a
murder is not yet a murderer.
Although our main concern in this paper is with occurrent-dependent roles, we will also have occasion
to mention object-dependent roles, which we will notate, in the same spirit, using the suffix ‘ob’, as, for
example, teacherob or presidentob .
3.5. Illustrative case study
The ideas introduced above may be usefully illustrated by applying them to a scenario comprising a
series of stages between someone’s initially applying for a job and their subsequently starting work. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.
In this diagram we can see:
1. The distinction between object-dependent and occurrent-dependent roles. All the roles here are
occurrent-dependent except employeeob . To be an employee is to be part of some organisation and
as such the role is dependent on the organisation, which is an object. Each of the other roles in the
diagram is dependent on some process or event, and these processes and events are shown on the
top line of the diagram. The employeeob role should not be confused with the occurrent-dependent
derived role job-starter−ev which is played by the employee for a certain — perhaps rather indefinite
— period after starting the job.
2. The distinction between event-dependent and process-dependent roles. Although applying for a job
does involve various processes (filling out forms, writing a letter of application, and so on), what
matters is the completion of these processes — someone who fills in the forms but neglects to send
them off cannot be described as an applicant. Hence the original applicant role is only played by
someone at the time the application is submitted and should be denoted applicantev . One is an
interviewee , however, throughout the process of being interviewed, and it is that process, rather
than its completion, that an interviewee prepares for before the event; for this reason the prospective
12 R. Mizoguchi et al. / Families of Roles
role is considered to be derived from intervieweepr . After the event, on the other hand, when the
applicant is awaiting the outcome of the interview, the fact that the interview has been completed
is the important thing, so we also include the role intervieweeev which is played at the moment of
completion of the interview and gives rise to the derived interviewee−ev .
3. The distinction between prospective and retrospective derived roles. This shows up clearly in the
case of applicant−ev and interviewee+pr . A person playing these roles has applied for the job, and will
be interviewed.
4. Derived roles can be time-limited. Whereas a typical retrospective role, such as murderer−ev and
Everest-climber−ev , stays with one for life, and even beyond, remaining in force indefinitely far into
the future, prospective roles do not hold indefinitely into the past. Thus a person does not play the
prospective role interviewee+pr until they have been short-listed and invited for interview. But our
case study also shows that there are time-limited retrospective roles as well, such as applicant−ev . In
contrast with murderer and Everest-climber, this role can become superseded by a later event: once
a person has been appointed, their application is no longer “live”, so it is no longer appropriate to
refer to them as an applicant.7
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Fig. 2. Roles played by someone applying for a job (for explanation, see §3.5).
4. The content of a role
How may a role be characterised? On the one hand we may seek a definition of the role, which in a
rigorous formulation may take the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for someone to play the
role; on the other hand we may seek a description of the role in terms of typical activities or processes that
a holder of the role may be expected to participate in. Both kinds of characterisation contribute to what
we call the content of a role, and as we shall see, the relationship between these two kinds of content may
differ from one kind of role to another.
More formally, then, we define:8
– The definitional content of a role consists of a set of conditions that are jointly necessary and suffi-
cient for a potential player to hold the role.
7At the risk of labouring the obvious, it should be pointed out that of course one can, after the appointment has been made, refer
back to an earlier time and speak of the people who were then applicants; but this concerns the holding of the role applicant−ev
in the past, not the present.
8Although we do not discuss such roles in this paper, it should be noted that the distinction between definitional and per-
formable content also applies to ‘relational roles’ such as owner and neighbour .
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– The performable content of a role comprises anything a role-holder does or may do in their capacity
as a holder of that role. Note that this can be an open-ended collection of properties not all of which
are expected to be performed by every holder of the role.
The simplest cases are original process-dependent roles such as walkerpr and singerpr : the content of
these roles consists of nothing more than the activities of walking and singing respectively, which provide
both the definitional and performable content of these roles.
Object-dependent roles such as schoolteacherob are more complex. The necessary and sufficient con-
dition for someone to be a schoolteacher is that they are employed in a teaching capacity by a school. But
what a schoolteacher actually does qua schoolteacher is a complex collection of activities including not
just teaching but also setting and marking homework, making lesson plans, managing a class, being on
lunch duty, organising societies, and so on. Thus in this case the performable content goes well beyond
what is explicitly stated in the definitional content.
It is worth noting that some of the performable content of a role might consist of the role-
holder’s taking on additional roles. In the case of schoolteacherob these roles might be such things as
Head -of -Mathematicsob or sports-coordinatorob . We shall say that such roles are subordinate to the
main role to whose performable content they contribute. In Figure 2, we can see that the roles of the
interviewee family are subordinate to the role applicant−ev : being interviewed is one of the activities char-
acteristically associated with being a job applicant. It is no argument against this that not all applicants
are interviewed, since the performable content of a role is an aggregation of all the subordinate roles and
activities that a player of the role might play or participate in in their capacity as role-holder.
A similar divergence typically occurs in the case of derived occurrent-dependent roles. A good example
is murderer−ev . Many different things might happen to someone as a result of their committing a murder:
they might go on the run, becoming fugitives from justice (subordinate role: wanted person), be arrested,
charged, tried (subordinate role: defendant), convicted (subordinate role: convict), and imprisoned (sub-
ordinate role: prisoner ). It is important to note that insofar as a murderer participates in any of these
processes, he does so specifically as a player of that role, as a murderer, in contrast to other processes
such as eating and sleeping, which he participates in merely as a person, not as a murderer. As such, the
former processes form part of the performable content of murderer−ev , the definitional content in this case
consisting only of the fact of having played the original murdererev role.9
Similar processes also form part of the performable content of the derived role criminal−ev , which
is played by anyone who has committed a crime; murderer−ev may be regarded as a specialisation of
criminal−ev and as such inherits its content. But we can refine our description of the processes forming
the performable content of murderer so that they specifically relate to murderers rather than other kinds of
criminal. The subordinate roles are now wanted murderer , murder defendant , convicted murderer , and
imprisoned murderer , and properly speaking it is these refined versions which constitute the performable
content of the derived role murderer−ev . This suggests that the elements of the content of a derived role
can in every case be specified with reference to the content of the original role from which it is derived: in
this case, the original murder role, whose content is just the act of committing a murder.
The content of prospective derived roles can be characterised in similar ways. The original
exam-candidatepr role is played by someone while they are actually sitting an exam, an activity which
comprises various subordinate activities such as thinking about the questions and writing down answers.
The definitional content of the corresponding prospective derived role exam-candidate+pr is the mere fact
that the person playing the role is due to sit an exam in the future. The performable content comprises
any activities or subordinate roles that someone might undertake specifically in consequence of this: such
activities as revising lecture notes, doing practice questions, ensuring they are correctly registered for the
exam, and making a note of the time and place at which it will be held — all of which, again, are specified
with respect to the content of the original role, the sitting of the exam itself. Other activities such as eating
and sleeping that are performed by the candidate merely as a person, without reference to the up-coming
9It is worth pointing out that these subordinate roles can also be played by someone who is not a murderer; it is, after all, not
unknown for someone to be wrongly arrested, charged, tried, convicted and even, alas, imprisoned for murder.
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exam, do not form part of the content of the derived role — although if a candidate embarks on a special
diet in the belief that it will enhance their exam performance then perhaps this too could be included in
the performable content of exam-candidate+pr .
The picture we have, then, is of a derived role having a simple definitional content, typically described
in terms of the role-holder having played (or being about to play) the original role from which it is derived,
and a much richer performable content, comprising a range of different processes or activities, which the
role-holder may be expected to participate in, forming as it were a visible penumbra around an essentially
unobservable central core. Thus we can observe someone waiting on the platform or sitting expectantly
in the stationary train, and thereby characterise them as a departing passenger, but we cannot otherwise
observe the fact of their being about to depart, although it is this latter fact that provides the defining
criterion for the role; similarly, we might observe the murderer being apprehended by the police, tried,
and imprisoned, but we cannot usually observe the fact of their having murdered (though if the evidence
presented in court is sufficiently vivid and direct we might come close to doing so). Table 1 illustrates
these two kinds of content for a number of role-types that we discuss in this paper; the content elements
are expressed as predicates (with free-variable x) which (may) apply to the role-holder. These can be
understood as picking out occurrent types; the idea is that a role-holder performs the role by participating
in instances of one or more of the occurrent-types in its performable content.
Table 1
Definitional and Performable Content for a selection of role types.
Role Definitional Content Performable Content
murdererev x murders someone x murders someone
murderer−ev x has murdered someone x is wanted, arrested, tried, convicted,
imprisoned. . . .
exam-candidatepr x is sitting an exam x is sitting an exam (including: writing
answers, thinking about the questions)
exam-candidate+pr x is scheduled to sit an exam x is revising, arranging transport to the
venue, . . .
exam-candidate−ev x has sat an exam but the re-
sults have not yet been an-
nounced
x is waiting eagerly/nervously/. . . for
the results
schoolteacherob x is contracted to work for a
school as a teacher
x teaches classes, sets and marks home-
work, manages a class, organises school
societies, takes playground duty, makes
lesson plans, . . .
singerpr x is singing x is singing
choirmemberob x is a registered member of a
choir
x goes to rehearsals, sings in concerts,
practises at home, participates in and
helps organise choir social events, acts
as a committee member, . . .
applicantev x submits a job application x submits a job application
applicant−ev x has applied for a job and the
application is still “live” (i.e.,
not rejected)
x is rejected or shortlisted, invited for
interview, preparing for interview, inter-
viewed, . . .
In the light of this distinction between two kinds of content, we can now be more precise about exactly
what is meant by ‘playing’ a role. Specifically, we can distinguish holding a role from performing it; we
regard these as the two components of playing a role:
– To hold a role R is to satisfy the definitional content of R.
– To perform a role R is to participate in some part of the performable content of R while holding R.
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It is easy to think of cases where a person can hold a role while not performing it: for example, a teacher
is still a teacher when asleep, and in our terminology this state of affairs is exactly characterised by noting
that a sleeping person can hold a teacher role but cannot perform it.10
Even more: it is possible to hold a role without ever playing it. Think of someone who is appointed
as a teacher but before they can start work they fall seriously ill and have to take extended sick leave;
eventually they resign from the post, while still on leave. This could happen also in the case of derived
roles: for example, if a murderer, after murdering, just gets on with his life as if nothing had happened, and
nobody ever suspects him so he is never the target of a police investigation and never brought to justice,
then arguably he holds the role murderer−ev but never performs it. Of course, it could be said that even
in this case the murderer knows he has murdered, and having this knowledge is something in which he
participates as murderer and therefore it forms part of the performable content of the role; so to make the
example even more fanciful we could suppose that the murderer develops amnesia immediately after the
murder and is unaware that he has murdered.
In contrast to these cases, there are other roles which it is not possible to hold without performing them;
these are the original occurrent-dependent roles. In fact, one only comes to hold such roles by performing
them. It may be tempting to argue, however, that having started performing the role, one might then be
said to continue to hold it even through interruptions in the performance, so that, for example, a singer is
still performing as a singer during a five bars’ rest in the middle of a song. Here we must refer back to our
remarks in §3.1 concerning whether processes can admit “gaps”. There we concluded that the appearance
of gappy processes was an illusion arising from variant interpretations of the verb designating the process:
in this case, exactly how broadly or narrowly we should understand ‘singing’. At the most basic level, to
sing is to produce musical sounds with the voice, and to be a singerpr in this sense one must be singing
in this sense; but singing a song, for example, is understood to include any rests during the song when
no vocal sounds are produced. If that is what one means by singing, then during the rests one is indeed a
singerpr . Thus in either case the definitional and performable contents coincide.
In general, the question of just how broadly or narrowly a process-verb is to be understood — and the
implications this has for the content of a process-dependent role — is a delicate one. Consider the case of
the driver of a car who stops at a service station for a comfort break; if during that time a policeman asks
‘Who is the driver of this car?’ it may in one sense still be true during the break that the person who was
driving it before is the driver. As with singing, we may distinguish between driving narrowly conceived
as the activity of actually sitting in the driver’s seat and controlling the car, and a somewhat broader view
of driving as being the driver of the car for a particular journey. On both views, driver is an original
process-dependent role: the difference lies in what the process in question is taken to be. An interesting
case is where a couple share the driving, with the husband taking over the driving from his wife after the
service-station break. In this case there is no straightforward answer to the policeman’s question. But on
either view of driving, one only holds the role driverpr by actually performing it.
A final note in this section: Although ‘perform’ connotes something active, some roles are essentially
passive and as such are ‘performed’ as it were by proxy, through the active performance of some element
other than the role-holder. We have already seen this in the case of an election candidate: the active part
of being a candidate is campaigning, and that happens exclusively before the election, forming part of the
performable content of candidate+pr ; during the election itself, when the role candidatepr is held, all the
‘performing’ is done by the voters and those manning the polling stations; and similarly the performable
content of candidate−ev is in the hands of those counting the votes. As one might expect, this kind of “pas-
sive performance” is particularly to be expected in the case of inanimate role-holders such as destination
and obstacle . We would argue that destination is the prospective derived role corresponding to the orig-
inal passive role be-arrived -at-by . Thus, for example, Mary’s destination is a place which Mary is ex-
pected to arrive at. This role is held by a place so long as Mary is intent on reaching it; it is performed by
10The distinction between holding a role and performing it is closely related to that between two senses of play introduced
in (Mizoguchi et al.,2012a), which capture the distinction between being having been assigned a role (play_1) and actually
realising it (play_2). In essence this is the same distinction, so long as one understands ‘assign’ sufficiently broadly to mean that
to be assigned a role is just to satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for holding it.
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the place so long as Mary is actually travelling towards it with that intention. A comparable analysis for
obstacle should be possible, but requires care.
5. Some problematic cases
In this section we consider a number of problematic cases to illustrate some further subtleties of our
theory.
5.1. ‘Choice’
When someone chooses between a number of alternatives, the alternative chosen is called their choice.
Here choice is an original role played by the alternative at the moment of its being chosen: in our notation
it is choiceev . But we still talk about choices before the moment of choosing: ‘There are three choices of
flavour available’. In this case we are dealing with a prospective derived role choice+ev . As always with
prospective roles, it is possible for something to play it without eventually playing the original role from
which it is derived; in the case of choice+ev we know, by the nature of things, that in any given choice
situation all but one of the players of this will end up not playing the role choiceev . After the choice has
been made, we still refer to the chosen alternative as a choice; in this case it is choice−ev .
To summarise, choice+ev refers to any of a set of alternatives available to be chosen, choiceev refers
to that alternative which actually is chosen, at the time of choosing, and choice−ev refers to the chosen
alternative after it has been chosen (for as long as the fact of its having been chosen is meaningful). This
family of roles aligns neatly with the three components of a nucleus in Moens and Steedman’s theory
(1988): preparatory process, culmination, and consequent state. In this case the preparatory process is
purely passive, any activity involved being on the part of the person doing the choosing rather than of the
things available to be chosen.
The choice roles are closely related to the election-candidate role, since electing a candidate is indeed
making a choice — although this case is more complicated since the choice is made collectively, being
derived by a kind of aggregation from the choices of the individual electors. But again, one is no longer
a candidate after one has been elected (or failed to be elected), so there is no corresponding retrospective
role. In the case of the other use of ‘candidate’, as an exam candidate, it is possible that all the candidates
are successful. We might think of this as being ‘chosen’ by the examiners, but the nature of the situation
is very different, making it less natural to describe it in this way.
5.2. ‘Witness’
Here we consider further the case of witness which was mentioned briefly in §3.2, although glossing
over the niceties. In fact the exact nature of witnessing depends on the nature of what is witnessed. To
witness an event is an event, but to witness a process could be either an event or a process: you can merely
catch sight of someone in the act of walking, say, or you can follow the process attentively. For a durative
event, the unfolding of which involves a process, witnessing the event is an event, the unfolding of which
involves witnessing the process: in such a case one is witnesspr while one is actually watching the event
in progress, and is then fleetingly witnessev at its completion. Thus witnessing can be either process-
dependent or event-dependent. However, what one might subsequently testify to is always a witnessing
event: in the case of witnessing a pure process, it is enough to catch sight of the process, and this is an
event, regardless of whether or not one continues watching; and for witnessing an event, it is necessary to
witness its completion, which is again an event. Compare: ‘Did you see the defendent beating his wife?’
(to truthfully answer ‘yes’ it is enough to have caught sight of the beating) and ‘Did you see the defendent
beat his wife for five minutes?’ (for this one must have completed five minutes’ worth of watching the
beating). Thus the retrospective role is always witness−ev .
To add to the complications, in English the word ‘witness’ has three distinct but related meanings:
a witness to an event, a witness testifying in court, and a person witnessing a signature to validate a
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contracting process. Let us designate these three roles witness1 , witness2 , and witness3 . Up to now we
have only discussed witness1 . It is noteworthy that in Japanese there are three different words for these
roles,11 which perhaps supports the idea that what we are doing in this paper is ontological, not linguistic,
analysis.
The three kinds of witness differ in some significant respects. For example, the original witness2 role
is process-dependent (witness2pr ), since what is important is the process of giving testimony, which is
not something that by nature moves towards a well-defined completion. By contrast, witness3 is event-
dependent, since what matters is the completion of the process by the witness appending their signature to
the document. The threewitness roles also differ in the kinds of derived roles they admit. Since awitness2
and, in most cases, a witness3 is formally designated as such before the actual witnessing is performed,
there is a clear use for witness2+pr and witness3
+
pr . But this never happens with witness1 : a player of
this role can only be described as a witness during or after the event that they witness. The retrospective
role witness1−ev , on the other hand, is important and is frequently encountered: it designates someone as
having witnessed an event. Such a person might, if the event is of a serious nature, be called upon to give
testimony in court; we can say, therefore, that the role witness2pr forms part of the performable content
of witness1−ev . This does not work the other way round, though, since not all people witnessing in court
are there because they have witnessed an event — an expert witness may be called to give testimony based
on their specialist knowledge of some relevant science, for example.
5.3. ‘Invited speaker’, ‘conference chair’, etc
At first glance, invited -speaker appears to be an occurrent-dependent role referring to someone who is
giving an invited talk at a conference. But of course we do not only call someone an invited speaker while
the talk is in progress: in fact invited speakers are usually fixed a considerable time before the conference,
and during that time they will be engaged in activities such as writing a paper, preparing slides, and making
travel arrangements, which are directly related to their role as invited speaker. On the view that the original
role here is that of actually presenting the talk, these preparatory activities must be regarded as belonging
to a derived role, invited -speaker+pr , of which they form the performable content.
Plausible though this may seem, it is somewhat problematic. Indeed, invited -speaker is just one
role amongst several that are associated with a conference; other examples include conference-chair ,
programme-committee-member , reviewer , and presenter . Like invited -speaker , these roles are as-
signed well before the start of the conference itself, and in most such cases the greater part of the work
done in these capacities actually happens before the conference. If we take the prima facie view of these
roles as occurrent-dependent roles whose context is the conference or some part of it, considered as an oc-
current, then as suggested in the case of invited -speaker , all this work prior to the conference would have
to be regarded as performable content relating to prospective derived roles such as conference-chair+pr
and programme-committee-member+pr . But that could only be the case if the work done before the con-
ference could be viewed as a preparation for their participation in the conference; for a programme com-
mittee member, at least, this is emphatically not the case since it is quite usual for programme committee
members not to attend the conference at all, without this being considered to diminish their performance
of the role. Even in the case of invited speakers, where attendance at the conference is a required part of
the role, it is worth pointing out that the role includes not just preparing and giving their talks, but also,
for example, raising the profile of the conference by having their names listed on the website, which again
cannot be seen as preparation for what they do during the conference itself.
These conference-dependent roles are in some ways analogous to school-dependent roles like teacher
which we considered earlier. The teacher role is assigned to someone when they are appointed as a teacher,
and they explicitly play that role by participating in a variety of activities which take place during the
time that they hold the role: these activities form the performable content of the role. Even when not
participating in such activities, for example when asleep or at home watching television, they can still be
11mokugekisha ( ), shounin ( ), and tachiainin ( ) respectively.
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said to be a teacher. Similarly, during the time that one is designated as a conference chair, programme
committee member, or indeed invited speaker, there are various activities one participates in precisely
in those capacities, but for a good deal of the time over which one holds these roles one is not actively
performing them.
In the light of this, a plausible solution to the problem of conference-related roles is that they are de-
pendent not on the conference as an event but on the conference organisation as an object. Just as a
school comprises various different roles such as headob , secretaryob , teacherob , so a conference organ-
isation comprises the roles under discussion here such as chairob , programme-committee-memberob ,
invited -speakerob , and delegateob . This has the added advantage that it provides a ready explanation for
cases where these roles are unfilled. Once the conference organisation is set up, various positions on the
organising committee may be defined before anyone is appointed to them: the roles are created before the
corresponding role-holders. This cannot easily happen with occurrent-dependent roles.
It remains true that the conference itself is an event, and indeed there are event-dependent roles that
are played during it, for example a person who asks a question after a talk. Some roles may have closely
related object-dependent and event-dependent forms: presenter , considered as someone who has submit-
ted a paper which has been accepted for presentation at the conference, should be regarded as dependent
on the conference-organisation object, and therefore as presenterob; they hold the role from the moment
their paper has been accepted, and they play it not only when presenting the paper at the conference itself
but also when preparing camera-ready copy for the proceedings and slides to show during the presenta-
tion; during the presentation itself they are also playing the occurrent-dependent role presenterpr , that is,
someone who is actually presenting a paper. This role also forms part of the performable content of the
invited -speakerob role.
5.4. Habitual roles: cyclist, singer, etc.
If we say that a cyclist passed us on the road, then we are using the term ‘cyclist’ to mean someone
who is currently cycling, that is, performing the original process-dependent role cyclistpr . But if we say
that several of our colleagues are cyclists, we do not mean that they are actually cycling at that time, but
rather that they habitually cycle. This sense of ‘cyclist’ therefore refers to a different role, which we might
call a habitual role; let us denote this cyclisthab . Many other nouns formed from verbs in this way, such
as singer , smoker , and reader , can similarly be used to denote either original process-dependent roles
(Xpr) or habitual roles (Xhab). How should such roles be analysed?
One possibility would be to regard habitual roles as an addition to the family of occurrent-dependent
roles. Just as the original roles are related to the present progressive form of the verb (‘is singing’, ‘is
murdering’), retrospective roles are related to the perfect tense (‘has murdered’), and prospective roles to
the future tense (‘will depart’), so it seems that habitual roles could be related to the habitual use of the
simple present (‘sings’, ‘cycles’). On the basis of this observation we might then characterise the habitual
roles as habitual derived occurrent-dependent roles.
In that case, the role cyclisthab would be dependent on an occurrent. But precisely what occurrent? One
becomes a habitual cyclist by cycling with sufficient frequency and/or regularity; how many individual
cyclings does it take? It is impossible to define this precisely; it might vary from case to case. In fact we
are asking how many times someone must cycle (sing, smoke, read, . . . ) for them to have the habit of
cycling (etc.). Whatever answer we give in a particular case, if someone can be correctly said to hold the
role cyclisthab , this must be because they have acquired the habit of cycling. What this suggests is that
a role such as cyclisthab should be dependent, not on any particular set of occurrences of cycling, but
on the habit of which those occurrences are manifestations. A habitual role, in other words, might be a
habit-dependent role.
Ontologically, what is a habit? A habit is not an occurrent: one has a habit, one does not do it. If
it is not an occurrent, then it must be a continuant of some kind. While habits bear some similarity to
dispositions, which are generally regarded as dependent continuants, there are clear differences between
the two categories. One can have a disposition to X without ever actually Xing, but to have the habit of
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Xing one must actually X, and moreover must do so “sufficiently” often. Habits resemble dispositions in
being dependent on their bearers, but unlike dispositions they are also dependent on the actual occurrents
through which they are manifested. Habit-dependent roles are therefore dependent on continuants which
are themselves dependent: a habitual role is dependent on a habit which is in turn dependent on both the
player of the role and the occurrents through which it is manifested.
If we accept this account (and here we merely propose it as a possibility), then our taxonomy of roles
would be as follows:
1. Continuant-dependent
1.1. Object-dependent (Xob)
1.2. Habit-dependent (Xhab)
2. Occurrent-dependent
2.1. Original (Xpr, Xev)
2.2. Derived
2.2.1. Retrospective (X−ev)
2.2.2. Prospective (X+pr, X
+
ev)
Within this taxonomy we can make useful distinctions between different roles with the same name. In
the case of writer , for example, we have:
– writerpr , someone who is actually writing
– writer−ev , someone who has written something (e.g., the writer of a letter one has received, or a book
that has been published)
– writerhab , someone who is in the habit of writing
– writerob , someone who is employed as a writer as part of an organisation (e.g., a newspaper)
Similar analyses could be given in many other cases.
Habitual roles are closely related to the original occurrent-dependent roles with the same name, because
the latter form part of the performable content of the former. One holds the role cyclisthab by possess-
ing the cycling habit; one can perform it by performing the role cyclistpr . The performable content of
cyclisthab could also include other activities such as cycle maintenance, joining a cycling club, searching
the web for information on the latest makes of bicycle, and so on; but unlike the regular performance of
cyclistpr none of these is an obligatory component of the role.
5.5. When do derived roles make sense?
Although it is possible in theory to form prospective and retrospective derived roles from any original
occurrent-dependent role, how much these derived roles really make sense depends on the original process
or action which constitutes the context for the original role. For a simple process-dependent role such
as walkerpr , we do not normally find a need to invoke either of the derived roles. A person playing the
walker+pr role would be someone who is going to walk; as already noted, this is usually signalled simply
by the use of the future tense and we do not use the term ‘walker’ for this. Similarly, instead of calling
someone a walker−ev , with reference to a past completion of an episode of walking, we would simply say
that they have walked.
There are, however, contexts in which it could be argued that ‘walker’ takes on a more structured
meaning. Imagine a case where a youth group has organised a day of activities, where individuals can sign
up for walking, climbing, or swimming. At the start of the day, before any of the activities have begun, the
organiser instructs the walkers, the climbers, and the swimmers to report to their respective leaders. Here
‘walker’ is used to refer, not to people who are walking, but to people who are intending to walk. In this
case it might be said that they hold a prospective role walker+pr . After the activities have finished, during
the evening debriefing, the organiser might call on the walkers to give an account of their day’s activities:
these people now play the role walker−ev .
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Similar remarks might be applied to the case of singer : after a concert someone might stand up and
say ‘I would like to congratulate all the singers on their performance’. What role is referred to by ‘singer’
here? Does it mean people who were singers during the concert, or does it mean people who now count
as singers by virtue of having sung? The more parsimonious explanation is the former; but if we think of
the singing here specifically as participation as a performer in the concert, then it may be appropriate to
invoke a retrospective singer−ev role here, which in this case could be regarded as a specialisation of the
event-dependent role performer−ev held by someone by virtue of having performed by singing.
Despite these special cases, it remains true that in general process-dependent roles do not give rise to
derived roles. A more exact reason for this concerns the nature of the actions or process constituting the
occurrent in question. Walking and singing are essentially both processes or activities, and are not in them-
selves characterised in terms of the achievement of some salient end-result. Yet it is precisely when such an
achievement is important that the retrospective derived role makes sense, since it can be used to describe
the status of someone who has that achievement to their credit (or shame!). This is why the retrospective
roles such as murderer−ev and Everest-climber−ev make sense. Other examples include prizewinner−ev ,
marathon-runner−ev , divorcee−ev , appointee−ev , choice−ev (§5.1), and witness−ev (§5.2). Performing in a
concert might similarly be regarded as an achievement, focussing on the successful completion of the per-
formance rather than the process, making it appropriate to use the retrospective derived role performer−ev .
Apart from choice, however, none of the roles just listed admits a prospective derived role; in general
prospective roles are less commonly encountered, because they require the original role to be such that
someone who is in some way scheduled or expected to perform it thereby acquires a special status that is
typically marked by various activities (such as preparation) which can form the performable content of the
prospective derived role. This works for roles such as departing-passenger , choice , and candidate , as
discussed above, since in these cases, we do find it convenient to refer to someone or something as being
currently in a state which is defined by a forward-looking reference to their playing the respective original
role (actually departing, being chosen, sitting the exam or being voted for).
To what extent are these matters ontological rather than linguistic? Language can guide ontological in-
vestigations, but ontology can help to explain linguistic phenomena too. The reason why we find it natural
to use some role terms in a prospective or retrospective derived sense is primarily ontological, concerned
with the nature of the roles described by them; for this reason, it is often helpful to turn to language in or-
der to uncover important ontological distinctions. It is not always easy to tell whether differences between
languages are superficial or reveal different ontological presuppositions on the part of speakers of the lan-
guages. A typical case is where a group of related roles are covered by a single term in one language and
distinguished by different terms in another — as in the case of the three Japanese translations of ‘witness’.
From an ontological point of view we could say that both the distinctness of the roles and their family
resemblance are grounded in reality; the two languages thus focus on different aspects of the reality — it
would be inappropriate to say that one is “right” and the other “wrong”, ontologically speaking.
6. A step towards formalisation
6.1. Primitive predicates
As a starting point for the formalisation, we treat the following one-place predicates as primitives. In
this listing, we also introduce the letters or strings by which we shall standardly designate variables used
as arguments for the predicates (though from a logical point of view all variables are interchangeable
— these choices are for readability purposes only). All entities are to be understood as particulars, not
universals.
– Entity(en): en is an entity
– Object(ob): ob is an object
– Occurrent(oc): oc is an occurrent
– Event(ev): ev is an event
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– Process(pr): pr is a process
– Role(r): r is a role (that is, a particular instance of a role concept)
– Roleholder(h): h is a role-holder
– Time(t): t is a time point
The first set of axioms specifies the subsumption hierarchy for the classes corresponding to these predi-
cates:12
Ax1.1Entity(en)→ Continuant(en)⊕Occurrent(en)
Ax1.2 Continuant(co)→ Object(co)⊕DependentContinuant(co)
Ax1.3DependentContinuant(dc)→ Role(dc)⊕Roleholder(dc)⊕ · · ·
Ax1.4Occurrent(oc)→ Event(oc)⊕ Process(oc)
Ax1.3 is left incomplete — the ‘· · ·’ is to be replaced by whatever other dependent continuants, such
as functions, dispositions, or habits, one wants to cover. For our present purposes it is unnecessary to
specify these. Also note that here we only handle object-roles; to accommodate occurrent-roles, which
were mentioned in the introduction but not otherwise discussed in this paper, the formalism would need
to be modified slightly.
We next introduce the following primitive relational predicates:
– Context-of(r, en): The context of role r is entity en.
– Holds(en, r, h, t): Entity en plays role r as role-holder h at time t.
– Part-of(en, en′, t): Entity en is part of entity en′ at time t.
– Participates-in(en, oc, t): Entity en participates in occurrent oc at time t
– Present(en, t): Entity en is present at time t.
The next set of axioms specifies the domain of arguments for each of the primitive relational predicates:
Ax2.1 Context-of(r, en)→ Role(r) ∧ Entity(en)
Ax2.2Holds(en, r, h, t)→ Entity(en) ∧Role(r) ∧Roleholder(h) ∧ Time(t)
Ax2.3 Part-of(en, en′, t)→ Entity(en) ∧ Entity(en′) ∧ Time(t)
Ax2.4 Present(en, t)→ Entity(en) ∧ Time(t)
Ax2.5 Participates-in(en, oc, t)→ Entity(en) ∧Occurrent(oc) ∧ Time(t)
A number of axioms are needed to establish further connections between the primitive predicates:
Ax3.1 Context-of(r, en) ∧ Context-of(r, en′)→ en′ = en
Ax3.2 Context-of(r, en)→ ∃t.Present(en, t)
Ax3.3Roleholder(h)↔ ∃en, r, t.Holds(en, r, h, t)
Ax3.4Holds(en, r, h, t) ∧Holds(en′, r′, h, t′)→ en = en′ ∧ r = r′
Axiom 3.1 asserts that if a role has a context, it is unique. In the light of previous discussion, it might
be thought that a role must have a context; however, in the case of prospective derived roles, a potential
context may never actually be present, and axiom 3.2 stipulates that a context must be present at some time.
For further discussion of this point, see below. Axiom 3.3 ensures that a roleholder is always assocated
with a player, a role, and a time, and axiom 3.4 says that the player and the role for a given roleholder
are unique. The time need not be unique, however, since a role may be played by the same player over an
interval, encompassing many time points, and the same roleholder persists over that interval.
6.2. Defined predicates
Additional predicates are defined as follows:
12Here we are using ⊕ to indicate the exclusive-or operator.
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Df1.1Held-at(r, t) =def ∃en, h.Holds(en, r, h, t)
Df1.2ObjDepRole(r) =def Role(r) ∧ ∀ob(Context-of(r, ob)→ Object(ob))
Df1.3OccDepRole(r) =def Role(r) ∧ ∀oc(Context-of(r, oc)→ Occurrent(oc))
Df1.4OR(r) =def OccDepRole(r) ∧ ∀oc, t(Context-of(r, oc) ∧Held-at(r, t)→ Present(oc, t))
Df1.5DR(r) =def OccDepRole(r) ∧ ¬OR(r)
Df1.6DR−(r) =def DR(r) ∧ ∀oc, t, t′(Context-of(r, oc) ∧Held-at(r, t) ∧ Present(oc, t′)→ t′ < t)
Df1.7DR+(r) =def DR(r) ∧ ∀oc, t, t′(Context-of(r, oc) ∧Held-at(r, t) ∧ Present(oc, t′)→ t < t′)
Thus, Held-at(r, t) means that role r is played at time t; definitions 1.2 and 1.3 introduce object- and
occurrent-dependent roles respectively; definitions 1.4 and 1.5 introduce original and derived occurrent-
dependent roles; definitions 1.6 and 1.7 distinguish retrospective and prospective derived roles.
6.3. Theory of occurrent-dependent roles
From the definitions, it follows trivially as a theorem that any occurrent-dependent role is either an
original role or a derived role, but not both:
Th1OccDepRole(r)→ OR(r)⊕DR(r).
It does not, however, follow that every derived role is either prospective or retrospective, since on the basis
of the axioms listed so far it ought to be possible to have a derived role which is played both before and
after its context is present and hence is neither prospective nor retrospective. In practice, we would always
want to split such a mixed derived role into its prospective and retrospective components — compare the
discussion of the prospective and retrospective versions of the candidate role at the end of section 3.3. To
ensure this we introduce the axiom
Ax4.1DR(r)→ DR+(r)⊕DR−(r)
which is the first of a series of key axioms featuring the defined predicates. Further axioms of this series
follow.
First, the holder of an object-dependent role is part of the context of the role, whereas the holder of an
occurrent-dependent role participates in the context of the role:
Ax4.2ObjDepRole(r) ∧Holds(en, r, h, t) ∧ Context-of(r, ob)→ Part-of(h, ob, t)
Ax4.3OccDepRole(r) ∧Holds(en, r, h, t) ∧ Context-of(r, oc) ∧ Present(oc, t′) →
Participates-in(h, oc, t′)
Note that in Axiom 4.3 it is necessary to specify the time at which the context is present, since this may
differ from the time that the role is played. Note also that we use the variable ob in 4.2 to remind the reader
that in this case the context is an object (definition 1.2), but oc in 4.3 since there the context is an occurrent
(definition 1.3).
The definition of an original role states that its context is present when the role is played. By axiom 4.3,
this means that the player of the role participates in the context of the role at that time. This is stated in the
following theorem, which can be regarded as a simplified form of axiom 4.3 for original roles, analagous
to axiom 4.2 for object-dependent roles:
Th2OR(r) ∧Holds(en, r, h, t) ∧ Context-of(r, oc)→ Participates-in(h, oc, t).
In axioms 4.2 and 4.3 the parthood and participation of the player in the context is conditional on the
context actually existing, but as we have noted, this need not be the case for prospective derived roles. In
fact it is only in that case that we want to allow this context-failure to occur, so to ensure this we introduce
a further axiom
Ax4.4Role(r) ∧ ¬DR+(r)→ ∃en.Context-of(r, en)
Using this axiom we can refine axiom 4.2 and theorem 2 as follows:
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Th3ObjDepRole(r) ∧Holds(en, r, h, t)→ ∃ob(Context-of(r, ob) ∧ Part-of(h, ob, t))
Th4OR(r) ∧Holds(en, r, h, t)→ ∃oc(Context-of(r, oc) ∧ Participates-in(h, oc, t)).
A similar reformulation of axiom 4.3 is possible in the case of retrospective derived roles. This relies on
axioms 3.2, 4.3, and 4.4, which together with the relevant definitions result in
Th5DR−(r) ∧Holds(en, r, h, t)→ ∃oc, t′(Context-of(r, oc) ∧ t′ < t ∧ Participates-in(h, oc, t′)).
For prospective derived roles, however, we cannot take advantage of axiom 4.4 to guarantee the
actual existence of the context of the role. Here we are dealing with cases like candidate+pr and
departing-passenger+ev discussed previously, where it is always possible for an exam, an election, or a
departure to be cancelled without falsifying the status of the would-be participants up to that point as can-
didates or departing passengers. In this case the holding of the prospective role is conditional, not upon the
actual existence of a future context on which it could depend, but on some kind of expectation or foreshad-
owing of such a context. To handle this within our logical formalisation one possibility is to go beyond
the resources provided by first-order logic and make use of some form of modal possibility operator ♦.
Tentatively, we might write
Ax4.5?DR+(r)→ ♦∃oc.Context-of(r, oc),
while acknowledging that this does not say much until we have specified the required semantics for ♦;
this would require a careful analysis of the kinds of modality involved in the idea that, for example, the
passengers expect to depart. Assuming we have this, then the analogue of theorems 3 and 4 for prospective
derived roles could be
Th6?DR+(r) ∧Holds(en, r, h, t) →
♦∃oc, t′(Context-of(r, oc) ∧ t < t′ ∧ Participates-in(h, oc, t′)),
which says that when en plays the role r as h, a context for r, with h participating in it, may occur in the
future. Precisely what this means depends, as indicated above, on the semantics of the modal operator;
we leave this unspecified here but signal it as an important issue to be settled before full formalisation is
possible.
Setting this issue aside, we now turn to the definition and characterisation of event- and process-
dependent roles. These broadest categories can be defined straightforwardly as follows:
Df2.1EvDepRole(r) =def Role(r) ∧ ∀ev(Context-of(r, ev)→ Event(ev))
Df2.2 ProcDepRole(r) =def Role(r) ∧ ∀pr(Context-of(r, pr)→ Process(pr))
The distinction between processes and events can be expressed through the following axioms:
Ax5.1Event(ev)→ ∃t∀t′(Present(ev, t′)↔ t′ = t))
Ax5.2 Process(pr)→ ∃t∃t′∀t′′(Present(pr, t′′)↔ t < t′′ < t′)
Note that these axioms presuppose a particular view of events and processes, which may be too restrictive
for general use, but provides what we require for the present theory of roles. Thus, axiom 5.1 restricts
events to instantaneous events: it says that there is a unique moment of time at which the event is present.
This is in keeping with the idea that what is important for event-dependent roles is the completion of an
event — so in effect, axiom 5.1 identifies any event with its instantaneous culmination. Similarly, axiom
5.2 stipulates that a process instance is present at each moment within some open convex interval.
The role types ORev, ORpr, DR±ev, DR+pr can all be defined using the following schema:13
Df2.3 αRγβ(r) =def αR
γ(r) ∧ βDepRole(r),
where α ∈ {O,D}, β ∈ {Ev, Proc}, and γ ∈ {λ,+,−} (where λ is the empty string).
13The case DR−pr , which appears to be unrealised, should be excluded here.
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6.4. Content of a role
Next, we consider the performable content of a role and the distinction between holding a role and
performing it. As discussed in section 4, the performable content may be thought of as a collection
of occurrent-types. Although up to this point our formalisation has operated entirely at the level of in-
stances, we cannot proceed further without introducing types, specifically occurrent types. In keeping with
widespread ontological practice, we are prepared to treat types as first-order objects, representing them by
means of terms rather than predicates; this enables us to introduce predicates over types without departing
from a first-order formalism.
In order to formalise these ideas, we introduce new predicates as follows:
— OccType(ot): ot is an occurrent type
— Performable(ot, r): ot is part of the performable content of r
— Performs(h, t): role-holder h performs its role at time t
Note that in Performs(h, t) it is not necessary to specify the role using an extra argument r since this is
uniquely determined by the roleholder. The required argument-restriction axioms are as follows:
Ax6.1 Performable(ot, r)→ OccType(ot) ∧Role(r)
Ax6.2 Performs(h, t)→ Roleholder(h) ∧ Time(t)
The definition of performance of a role can now be given as
Df3.1 Performs(h, t) =def ∃en∃r∃ot∃oc(Holds(en, r, h, t) ∧ Performable(ot, r) ∧
Instance-of(oc, ot) ∧ Participates-in(h, oc, t))
In other words, a roleholder performs its role just when, qua holder of that role, it participates in an
instance of an occurrent type belonging to the performable content of the role.
6.5. Properties of role-holders
It will be noticed that in Axioms 4.2 and 4.3, and theorems derived using them, it is the roleholder,
rather than the entity playing the role, that is said to form part of or participate in the context of a role,
and it is appropriate here to say a little about how the properties ascribed to a role-holder are related to
the properties of the underlying entity. Although we have stated (in §2.2) that a role-holder inherits all
the properties of the entity playing the role, in addition to those further properties that the entity can only
be said to possess in their capacity as role-holder, for the purposes of the formalisation it is convenient
to restrict the properties that are ascribed directly to the role-holder to the latter set. Thus we will apply
the predicate ‘. . . teaches Mathematics’, say, to the role-holder John-as-Teacher1, but not to John himself,
and we will apply the predicate ‘. . . has blue eyes’ to John himself, but not to John-as-Teacher1.
This does not mean that we cannot say, for example, that a teacher has blue eyes, or that John teaches
mathematics; the way we can do such things in our formalisation is illustrated by the following examples:
– Suppose John-as-Teacher1 runs the school Chess Club, but we want to say that John runs that club
without explicit reference to his role as a teacher. We can write14
∃r, h(Holds(john, r, h, t) ∧Runs(h, chess-club, t)).
– Suppose John has blue eyes, and we want to say that Teacher1 has blue eyes. We write
∃x, r(Holds(x, r, teacher1, t) ∧Blue-eyed(x)).
14Here we use t as a generic time-point — for rendering sentences in the present tense we can assume that t denotes the present
moment ‘now’.
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– Suppose John sings bass in the local choir (nothing to do with the school), and we want to say that
Teacher1 sings in the choir. Being a choir-member is, of course, itself a role, so we must write
∃x, r, r′, h′(Holds(x, r, teacher1, t) ∧Holds(x, r′, h′, t) ∧ Sings-bass(h′, t)).
We could, if we wished, include further details about the nature of the role r′, for example,
Context-of(r′, c), where c denotes the particular choir in question, but the above formula already
captures the essence of what we want to say.
The philosophy behind this approach is that the only properties we ascribe directly to a person are those
properties which (s)he holds qua person, together with role ascriptions (the same idea applying, of course,
to entities other than people). Other properties must be ascribed indirectly through the role ascriptions
(for those properties which are possessed in a person’s capacity as a role-holder) or similar devices (for
properties belonging to phase sortals such as ‘caterpillar’ or ‘baby’).
An advantage of this approach is that it allows us, without contradiction, to ascribe contradictory prop-
erties to someone who possesses those properties as holders of different roles. Thus if John has separate
roles as a mathematics teacher and as a geography teacher, and is popular with his pupils in the first role,
but not in the second, then we can write
∃r, r′, h, h′(Holds(john, r, h, t) ∧Holds(john, r′, h′, t) ∧ Popular(h, t) ∧ ¬Popular(h′, t)).
We use the same approach for occurrent-dependent roles. Instead of Sings(rosemary, t), for example,
we write
∃r, h(Holds(rosemary, r, h, t) ∧ Sings(h, t)),
the role r in this case being of type singerpr; and if Brutus murders Caesar, we write
∃r, h(Holds(brutus, r, h, t) ∧Murders(h, caesar, t)).
Here the role r is of type murdererev . To say that Brutus, as Caesar’s murderer, flees from Rome, we write
∃r, h(Holds(brutus, r, h, t) ∧Has-murdered(h, caesar, t) ∧ Flees(h, rome, t)).
Here t is a time at which Brutus flees Rome and at which it is true that he has murdered Caesar — not the
time at which he murders Caesar. Thus the role r in this formula is of retrospective type murderer−ev . The
connection between the retrospective role and the original role from which it is derived is expressed by
∃r, h(Holds(x, r, h, t) ∧ Instance-of(r,murderer−ev)) ↔
∃r′, h′, t′(t′ < t ∧Holds(x, r′, h′, t′) ∧ Instance-of(r′,murdererev))
6.6. Conclusion
It must be emphasised that the formalisation is currently under development, so that what is presented
in this section should be treated as provisional. We do not claim to have resolved all issues arising from
the formalisation of our theory, but we believe it is important to include a preliminary formalisation here
as a demonstration that the theory presented in the preceding parts of the paper can be placed on a precise
and rigorous footing. Much remains to be done, however, and in particular we need to explore in detail the
implications of incorporating our formalisation of roles within existing upper-level ontologies.
7. Related Work
Although roles have been discussed by many researchers (Boella, van der Torre, & Verhagen,2007),
very little appears to have been published concerning the main topics discussed in this paper. The exist-
ing literature on roles is scattered amongst a number of different areas of research, for example Ontol-
ogy Engineering (Guarino,1992;Masolo et al.,2004;Loebe,2005,2007;Masolo et al.,2011), Database Mod-
elling (Steimann,2000,2007), Software Engineering (Chernuchin & Dittrich,2005;Baldoni, Boella, & van
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der Torre,2005), and Agent Systems (Zambonelli, Jennings, & Wooldridge,2003;Colman & Han,2007). A
computational model of roles together with their major characteristics was also discussed in our previous
work (Mizoguchi et al.,2007), as summarised in Section 2.1.
Although some of these works enumerate features of roles, and a few authors have tried to find a proper
definition of roles (Masolo et al.,2004;Steimann,2000), it remains an open question whether it is even
possible to give a single definition of role which everyone can agree upon (Boella et al.,2007). This paper
does not attempt to propose such a definition; instead, we simply aim to investigate the temporal aspects
of roles and propose a new framework within which we can distinguish derived roles from original roles.
It is generally agreed that roles are dependent entities, but various ideas have been put forward as to
precisely what they depend on. Steimann (2000) and Masolo et al. (2004) claim that roles depend on
relations; Loebe (2007) claims that they depend on contexts. Most of the roles discussed by the authors
are object-dependent roles such as teacher , whereas in this paper we have been mainly concerned with
occurrent-dependent roles, with a focus on their temporal aspects.
Loebe (2007) discusses top-level categories based on the determination of roles by context. For Loebe,
‘[A] context is to be understood as a more comprehensive whole in which a role may be interpreted as
a part. Indeed, assuming a very general notion of part-of, one can consider role-of as a specialisation of
part-of.’ Note that Loebe is here using role in the sense of our role-holder, and the ‘very general’ notion
of part-of includes the participates-in relation between a continuant and an occurrent. He presents three
role types: relational role, processual role, and social role, where his processual roles correspond to our
original process-dependent roles. In many ways Loebe’s approach is the closest to ours in terms of top-
level role organisation, but he does not discuss event-dependent roles, nor the family of occurrent roles
comprising original and derived roles which is the main theme of our paper.
Fan, Barker, Porter, and Clark (2001) also recognises the importance of constructing a hierarchy of role
concepts, and gives an example of Thing sub-classified into Entity and Role. Although the classification
of roles is not the main topic of the present paper, our theory does provide a deeper hierarchy of roles
than those presented by other authors.15 A main focus of (Fan et al.,2001) is to explore the relationship
between roles and purposes. The authors distinguish two relations between roles and entities: played-by
and purpose, where the former ‘represents that an entity is actually participating in an event’ and the latter
‘represents a role that the entity is intended to play, but says nothing about whether it is actually doing so’.
As an example they consider a hammer, whose purpose is ‘to be the instrument of a hammering event’,
the role being played when the hammer actually participates in such an event. This distinction seems to
occupy a similar territory to our distinction between holding and performing a role, but it is not exactly
the same distinction — in particular, for us, holding a role need not involve purpose, though it may do
so in many cases; more generally we would say that holding a role carries implications about what the
role-holder may be expected to do when performing the role, whether or not that can be ascribed to any
purpose.
In a previous co-authored paper (Masolo et al.,2011), constraints on the definitions of specific roles, as
well as various different kinds of roles, are discussed in a formal way, In particular, the main aim of that
paper is to solve the well-known ‘counting problem’. In the discussion of kinds of roles, the initial idea of
a derived role was discussed, and then formalised as historical role, characterised as ‘roles that are played
because of the fact that some other role was played in the past’ (p. 81). Examples discussed included
murderer and Everest-climber ; the salient characteristic of these properties is that, once acquired, they
persist forever, even when their bearers are no longer present. The idea of a family of occurrent-dependent
roles is, we believe, original to the present paper, although it is in harmony with the views expressed in
the earlier paper, where it is stated that ‘the derived roles of interest here are specified so that the time of
playing of the derived role differs from the time of playing of the original one’ (pp.80–81).
15An informal classification of roles which includes still more categories is discussed in (Mizoguchi et al.,2012b).
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8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have recapitulated and refined the theory of roles previously presented in (Mizoguchi et
al.,2007), and developed in detail an account of temporal aspects of occurrent-dependent roles previously
hinted at in (Masolo et al.,2011). We have introduced the distinction between original and derived roles
in order to explain the nature of historical roles. This led us naturally to the idea of a family of roles in
which are collected together an original role together with its associated derived roles, which may be either
retrospective or prospective. We also examined a number of problem cases, showing how they may be
handled within this framework; in particular, we noted that care is needed in applying these distinctions in
particular cases, particularly where what may at first sight appear to be an occurrent-dependent role turns
out, on deeper analysis, to be better handled as an object-dependent role (see in particular §5.3 and §5.4).
The family of occurrent-dependent roles helps us to identify what is ontologically primary, and what
secondary, amongst similar roles. Moreover, by attending closely to the characteristics of these different
kinds of roles we have been led to formulate a distinction between holding a role and performing it, which
we believe has not previously been given sufficient attention.
Although we have proposed several new concepts which help to clarify some puzzling features of roles,
many open questions remain. In particular, further work is needed to establish well-founded principles for
addressing such issues as:
– When should a role be classified as occurrent-dependent and when as object-dependent? (Compare
§5.3.)
– How can habitual roles, which seem to be dependent on a continuant that is itself dependent on
occurrent, be fully integrated into the theory? (See §5.4.)
– How exactly should prospective derived roles be formalised, given that their contexts might never
actually be present? (See §6.3.)
– What account should be given of roles played by occurrents? It is generally assumed that, whatever
they are, roles are played by continuant entities, which may play their roles contingently and tem-
porarily. But this is problematic if the entity playing the role is an occurrent. If someone washes their
hands in preparation for eating, then the washing might be said to play the role of a pre-process;
but when they wash their hands after eating, the washing, which may be qualitatively identical as
an action, plays the different role of a post-process . None the less, these are numerically distinct
actions, and it does not make sense to say that either of them assumes its role as a temporary part of
its lifetime as one would when a continuant plays a role.
– Do object-dependent roles have derived roles too? What account should we give of roles such as
ex -wife or president-elect , which look as though they might be described as retrospective and
prospective derivatives from the object-dependent roles wifeob and presidentob respectively?
– How far is it possible to disentangle the specifically ontological aspects of roles from issues relating
to the expression of roles in natural language? How important is it to do so? (See the discussion at
the end of §5.5.)
These questions should be enough to convince the reader that the ontology of roles remains a live area of
research in which there are still plenty of important results to be discovered. We offer this paper as a con-
tribution to the ongoing debate, providing some pointers to important new topics for further development.
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